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We study the mutual influence of authority and persuasion in the flow of opinion. Many social
organizations are characterized by a hierarchical structure where the propagation of opinion is
asymmetric. In the normal flow of opinion formation a high-rank agent uses its authority (or its
persuasion when necessary) to impose its opinion on others. However, agents with no authority may
only use the force of its persuasion to propagate their opinions. In this contribution we describe a
simple model with no social mobility, where each agent belongs to a class in the hierarchy and has
also a persuasion capability. The model is studied numerically for a three levels case, and analytically
within a mean field approximation, with a very good agreement between the two approaches. The
stratum where the dominant opinion arises from is strongly dependent on the percentage of agents in
each hierarchy level, and we obtain a phase diagram identifying the relative frequency of prevailing
opinions. We also find that the time evolution of the conflicting opinions polarizes after a short
transient.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge,89.75.Hc
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I. INTRODUCTION
The exchange of opinions plays an essential role in de-
cision making at all levels of social activities, from do-
mestic matters within the family, through business at
all scales, to political issues affecting a nation. The dy-
namics of opinion formation and transmission, as well
as the generation of consensus has attracted the atten-
tion of mathematicians and physicists. This is probably
due to the fact that the emergence of a collective state
is a feature reminiscent of the behavior of many-particle
systems in the fields of physics, chemistry and biology.
Therefore, the formation of public opinion has been the
subject of a number of recent works that, to some ex-
tent, capture the fundamental processes that determine
the emergence or not of consensus within a population
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. In Refs. [1, 2] the condition to reach
consensus in well mixed populations is analyzed. Addi-
tional results of similar models have been shown in Refs.
[4, 5], such as the relevance of the dynamical time scale
on the formation of minorities and the role of a complex
topology in the contact network. A more general class
of models has been studied in Refs. [3], in systems of
completely connected agents. Though, there is a feature
—not analyzed in those contributions— that plays and
important role in many social systems, and which cer-
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tainly affects the dynamics of the propagation of opin-
ion: hierarchy. A hierarchical organization characterizes
many social institutions, ranging from families to compa-
nies or governments, armies or churches. The emergence
of a hierarchical structure in social networks is, by its
own, the subject of related studies, such as those found
in [7, 8, 9, 10]. In a hierarchical system, the interaction
between two individuals is asymmetric if one of them be-
longs to a higher level of the hierarchy. Consequently,
it can exploit its authority to impose its opinion to the
other one, regardless of the actual value of this opinion.
Nevertheless, the lower levels of the hierarchy may well
be able to impose their opinion to the higher ones, if
they are persuasive enough. The situation is, to some
extent, similar to ecological systems involving competi-
tion between species that display different colonization
capabilities: the worse competitor may thrive if it is a
better colonizer [11].
The purpose of the present paper is to propose a simple
model for the flow of opinions in a hierarchical social
system. In this model, the agents are organized in a
hierarchy that determines their degree of authority in any
pair interaction. Besides, each agent is endowed with a
persuasion ability that may allow it to convey its opinion
to another agent, even against authority.
II. MODEL
We consider a population of N interacting agents, each
of them characterized by its opinion, its persuasion ca-
pability and belonging to an authority stratum. While
the opinion can be changed through interactions between
agents, the authority and the persuasion are assumed to
2be invariable. The agents are distributed in a hierarchy
of r authority levels enumerated from 1 (lowest author-
ity) to r (highest authority). We call xi, with 1 ≤ i ≤ r,
the fraction of the population that belongs to each level
of the hierarchy. We assign to each agent a value of per-
suasion, pi, chosen at random between 0 and 1. Initially
each agent has its own opinion which is represented by
its index, from 1 to N , i.e. Oi(t = 0) = i.
Since we are interested in the study of a population in
which the hierarchy imposes rules of interaction, persua-
sion is not the only way to convince an agent. Indeed,
agents with very different authority levels do not have a
symmetric interaction. We model this fact by allowing
an agent to convince another one only if the authority of
the convincer is higher, equal to, or one authority level
lower than that of the partner.
At each time step we pick an agent (i) at random which
will try to convince a partner by imposing its value of
opinion. The second agent j is selected at random from
the same or a lower level or the immediately upper one
(aj ≤ ai + 1). The interaction between agents is as fol-
lows: agent i tries to convince agent j using first its per-
suasion, in such a way that the opinion of j will become
that of i, i.e. Oj(t + 1) = Oi(t), with probability pi. If
persuasion fails, agent i will try to impose its authority:
if ai > aj then Oj(t + 1) = Oi(t); otherwise, no change
occurs. The final result of this process is a consensus
of opinions. This means that in the stationary state all
agents share the same opinion. The value of the resulting
dominant opinion identifies the agent that has convinced
the whole population, which we call the leader.
A. Numerical simulations
We perform numerical simulations for an r = 3 hier-
archy, which is the minimum number of authority levels
that gives nontrivial results and also allows us to build a
two dimensional diagram. We set the fraction of agents in
each level of authority and assign their values of persua-
sion at random. For all the initial conditions and random
number sequences studied, the simulations always arrive
to a final state where all the agents share the dominant
opinion. It is worth to emphasize that for a given allo-
cation of agents among the authority strata, the values
of the persuasion are attributed at random, therefore the
leader can belong to different authority levels for different
initial conditions. Then, for characterizing the leader’s
origin we consider an ensemble of samples and perform
an average over them. In Fig. 1 we plot typical results
for a system of N = 100 agents and 1000 samples. The
horizontal axis indicates the fraction of the total popu-
lation that has the maximum authority, x3, whereas the
vertical axis measures the fraction of agents in the inter-
mediate level of authority, x2. The label Ti represents the
fraction of samples in which a member of the i-th level
becomes the leader. In region labeled with Ti > Tj > Tk
the most frequent leader belongs to the i-th level of au-
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FIG. 1: Phase diagram showing the relative frequencies of the
level from which the leader arises. Labels x2 and x3 indicates
the fraction of the population in the intermediate and upper
levels, respectively. The lines represent the results of the mean
field model with β31 = 1 and β13 = 0.
thority, followed by leaders from the j-th level. One can
observe that in a large amount of this phase space (filled
with squares) the leader belongs to the highest authority
group, as it is expected. However, when the fraction of
agents in the top level is below x3 = 1/3, the interme-
diate stratum may impose one of their opinions (region
indicated by circles). Finally, when there are very few
top authority agents and a fraction x2 of intermediate
agents lower than 1/3, the opinion of the lowest stratum
may overpower the top ones (region indicated by trian-
gles). The lines in the figure separate different regions
obtained by means of analytical results that we discuss
in the next subsection.
Furthermore, to complete the characterization of the
phase space, we plot in Fig. 2 a map of the average per-
suasion of the leader agent corresponding to the points
of the diagram of Fig. 1. The smallest dots correspond
to an average persuasion 〈p〉 = 0.56 whereas the largest
ones correspond to 〈p〉 = 0.68. We remark that the dark-
est regions in the diagram correspond to situations where
most of the population has the same value of authority.
This diagram reflects two facts: a) when the majority of
the agents has the same authority, one of the more per-
suasive becomes the leader —even the agents with the
highest authority need a persuasion above the average
to impose their opinion— and b) in the region where all
levels have similar population, the authority prevails over
the persuasion, although the average value of the leader’s
persuasion is bigger than the average persuasion over the
population (〈p〉 = 0.5).
Whereas the phase diagram shown on Fig. 1 tells us
which is the authority stratum from where the leader
comes, the examination of the time evolution that leads
to this final state may improve the comprehension of the
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FIG. 2: Map of the average persuasion of the leader. The axis
labels are the same as in Fig. 1. The smallest dots correspond
to an average persuasion 〈p〉 = 0.56 whereas the largest ones
correspond to 〈p〉 = 0.68
mechanisms involved. Since we know the authority level
from which each opinion comes from, we can follow the
evolution of the number of agents that share an opinion
corresponding to each stratum. This temporal evolution
is shown in Fig. 3, for a system of N = 1000 agents.
Each curve corresponds to the number of agents sharing
the opinion of an agent belonging to the highest author-
ity level (circles), intermediate level (squares) and lowest
level (triangles). Each plot corresponds to a different
sample with the same distribution of population in the
three levels, x3 = 3/5, x2 = 1/5 and x1 = 1/5. In these
figures we do not distinguish between different opinions
within a given authority level. We observe that, after a
short transient, the system becomes polarized. Agents
belonging to one of the authority strata are convinced by
agents by one of the other two levels. So, opinions origi-
nated in this stratum quickly disappear, while agents in
the other two levels keep struggling for a longer period
(see, for example, in Fig. 3[b] the struggle between level
3 vs. level 1). The final result depends on the sam-
ple: while in Fig. 3[a] an agent from level 3 becomes the
leader, in Fig. 3[d] the leader comes from level 2. It is
remarkable that in Fig. 3[c] the fight is between the two
lower levels, while the opinion of the highest one disap-
pears after a relatively long transient. This polarization
seems to be a verification of what happens in many elec-
tion contests when the public opinion converges to the
two strongest candidates.
B. Mean field analytical solution
A simple model for this system can be solved within a
mean field approximation. As we are mainly interested
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FIG. 3: Time evolution of the number of agents sharing the
opinion of an agent belonging to a given authority level, for
a distribution in the hierarchy x3 = 3/5, x2 = 1/5 and
x1 = 1/5. Circles indicate the number of agents that have
an opinion of an agent with authority ai = 3, squares corre-
spond to ai = 2 and triangles to ai = 1.
in the authority stratum where the leader comes from,
we consider that all the agents in a given level have the
same opinion, i.e., there are only as many opinions as
authority levels. This is equivalent to first “thermalize”
the opinions within each authority stratum before to put
them in interaction. This last process allows individuals
to pass from one opinion group to the other.
The mean field approach implies that at each time step
we compute the averages of the quantities of interest,
which in turn depend only on their averages in the pre-
ceding steps. We are interested in obtaining the average
number of agents in the different opinion groups. It is
clear that, although initially opinion groups and author-
ity groups coincide, as the system evolves each opinion
group will have members with different levels of author-
ity. If we call Gij (1 ≤ (i, j) ≤ r) the subgroup that
contain agents with authority i and opinion j, the dy-
namics of the system can be fully described by studying
the evolution of gij(t), which is the population, at time
t, of the subgroups Gij .
To perform the mean field calculation, we assume that
two agents, belonging to authority levels k and l, are
chosen at random. The agent in k convinces the agent in
l with probability βkl. That is, there will be a transition
from the group Gla to the group Glb with probability βkl,
where a is the opinion originally held by the agent in l
and b is the opinion it adopted (that of the first agent).
Notice that the opinion of the first agent is not affected
by the dynamics.
The model introduced in Section IIA corresponds to
the case where βkl = 0 for |k− l| > 1. When the relation
between the authority levels does not rule out the interac-
tion, one must consider two cases: k > l and l−1 ≤ k ≤ l.
4In the first case, the agent in l always changes its opinion
because its authority level is lower than k; thus, βkl = 1.
For l − 1 ≤ k ≤ l we assume that the effect of persua-
sion is averaged out in the population of each level, and
therefore βkl is simply the average of the persuasion of
the agents in level k. Thus, for a uniform distribution of
persuasion (as considered in the simulations above), we
have that βkl = 1/2 for l − 1 ≤ k ≤ l. The fact that
the matrix βij does not change in time implies that, ne-
glecting finite size effects, the distribution of persuasion
in each subgroup remains unaltered. This assumption
only holds if the initial distribution is the same in each
subgroup. In our model this is the case, because the in-
teraction does not depend on the persuasion of the agent
who (eventually) changes its opinion. Then, the proba-
bility that it leaves the subgroup does not depend on his
own persuasion.
Since the dynamics cannot change the total number of
agents in each level of authority, there are r constraints:∑r
j=0 gij = xi, for all i, where xi is the fraction of agents
with authority index i, as defined previously.
By considering, at time t + 1, the probabilities that
members of groups other than Gij enter or leave this
group, one can write the evolution equation for all the
subgroups. Let Oi(t) = (g1i(t), g2i(t), . . . , gri(t)) be the
vector of populations of the opinion group i. Its time
evolution is given by (see Appendix):
Oi(t+ 1) = (I+A/N)Oi(t) ; 0 < i < r. (1)
where I is the identity matrix, and the matrix A is given
by:
Aii = −
∑
k 6=i
xkβki, (2)
Aij = xiβji, i 6= j. (3)
Notice that the matrix A is not symmetric. More-
over, it has only negative or null eigenvalues because the
population of each opinion group must remain bounded.
Indeed, it has one null eigenvalue, corresponding to the
eigenvector O = (x1, . . . , xr). This is evident from the
fact that the number of agents in each authority group
must be conserved:
∑r
i=0 Oi(t + 1) =
∑r
i=0 Oi(t). Ex-
cept for very special values of the parameters, this will
be the only eigenvector corresponding to the null eigen-
value [12].
For large values of N equation (1) can be written as:
Oi(t) = exp(At/N)Oi(0) ; 0 < i < r, (4)
where Okl(0) = δklxl. To obtain an expression inde-
pendent of the number of agents N we rescale the time,
t→ tN .
As a consequence of the fact that A has only one non-
negative eigenvalue, the calculation of the asymptotic
populations of each subgroups is an easy task: in the
limit t → ∞, the evolution matrix (I +A/N)t has only
one non-vanishing eigenvalue, whose value is 1. Thus,
limt→∞(I+A/N)
t = P−1QP, whereQ is a matrix whose
only non-zero element is Q11 = 1, P
−1 is the matrix of
right eigenvectors of A and P is the matrix of its left
eigenvectors. As we need only the eigenvectors corre-
sponding to the non-zero eigenvalue and, as it was men-
tioned above, its right eigenvector is already known, we
only have to calculate the left eigenvector; i.e. v such
that vA = 0. This eigenvector is very easily obtained
by taking the vector product of any r − 1 columns of
the matrix A. With this procedure, v is obtained up to
a multiplicative constant C which can be calculated by
imposing the restriction that the sum of all populations
is equal to 1. Consequently, the asymptotic populations
are given by:
gij(∞) = C xi xj vj , 0 < i, j < r, (5)
C =
r∑
j=0
xj vj . (6)
We have studied in detail the case r = 3 and deter-
mined a phase diagram by varying the fraction of agents
in authority levels 2 and 3, as in Fig. 1. Our first exam-
ple is designed to compare with the previous numerical
results: while agents with the highest level of authority
can fully influence the lowest, the opposite interaction is
not allowed, i.e. β31 = 1 and β13 = 0. The analytical
results are plotted together with the numerical ones on
Fig. 1. The final state of the system, in the mean field
approximation, is a coexistence of opinions, where their
relative weights are equivalent to the frequencies of leader
opinions in the simulation (averaging over a large number
of individual samples). Therefore, the label Ti must be
interpreted as representing the fraction of agents that en-
dorses the opinion i in the asymptotic limit and, similarly,
Ti > Tj > Tk means that, in this region, the prevailing
opinion corresponds to the i-th authority level, followed
by the opinions from j-th and k-th levels. It is interesting
to notice that, even in this extreme case, there are values
of the parameters for which the lowest authority opin-
ion can become the prevailing one. It is also remarkable
the agreement between analytical results (indicated by
lines in the diagram) and numerical ones (indicated by
geometrical symbols). Indeed, almost all the phase sepa-
rations coincide, with the only exception of the transition
from T3 > T2 > T1 to T3 > T1 > T2. In this case, the
difference is restricted to the second placed in the rank-
ing of opinions where there is a significative shift in the
frontier line. This can be due either to a lack of statistics
in the simulations, given that the line is not well defined,
or to a limitation of the mean field approach.
As a second example, we consider the case where the
highest and lowest levels of authority cannot communi-
cate, i. e., β13 = β31 = 0. To take into account the in-
fluence of authority, we consider that an agent will con-
vince another with a lower authority, but the opposite
will only happen with probability 1/2: β32 = β21 = 1,
β12 = β23 = 1/2. The results are shown in Fig. 4. Notice
that if the intermediate level is not populated no evolu-
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FIG. 4: Phase diagram showing the mean field results of
the relative frequencies of the level from which the leader
arises. The transition probabilities are: β13 = β31 = 0 while
βij = 1/2 for all the other cases. Labels x2 and x3 indicates
the fraction of the population in the intermediate and upper
levels, respectively.
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FIG. 5: Phase diagram showing the mean field results of the
relative frequencies of the level from which the leader arises.
The transition probabilities are: β13 = 1/2, β31 = 1 while
βij = 1/2 for all the other cases. Labels x2 and x3 indicates
the fraction of the population in the intermediate and upper
levels, respectively.
tion is possible. When comparing the results of Fig. 4
with those of the previous case we observe some qualita-
tive changes in the transitions lines T1 = T3 and T1 = T2.
Both changes happen in the region of small x2, that is
small population of the intermediate level.
As a final example, we allow the highest authority to
fully influence the lowest (β31 = 1) while the opposite
happen in only half of the interactions (β13 = 1/2). The
corresponding phase diagram is shown in Fig. 5, where
we verify that the resulting effect is an increase in the
influence region of the lowest level for low x2 and an
increase of the influence of the highest authority level for
high x2.
III. CONCLUSIONS
We have described a simple model of opinion forma-
tion in a society where both persuasion and authority are
considered. The model has the advantage of having an
analytical mean field solution that exhibit a fair coinci-
dence with the numerical results. We have concentrated
in the three-authority level case as it is the one with the
minimum number of levels permitting to explore the hy-
pothesis of the model. Also, in this case, we are able to
plot the results in a two-dimensional phase diagram.
When the higher authority level can impose its opin-
ion on all the others (Fig. 1) it is clear that its opinion
prevails up to the case when just a small fraction of the
population belongs to this level, providing that the pop-
ulation of the intermediate level is also small. As the
intermediate level acts as a transmitter, when the frac-
tion of occupation of this level increases it is the opinion
of the lowest one that becomes the leader. Only when
the percentage of occupation of the intermediate level
is bigger than 30% the opinion of the intermediate level
prevails. The results make explicit the importance of
the “middle class” as a transmitter to modify the ruling
opinions. Moreover, the diagram of Fig. 2 suggest that
even among the agents belonging to the highest author-
ity group, the persuasion determines who will impose its
opinion.
The other cases studied (Figs 4 and 5) show that ei-
ther cutting the direct communication between the high-
est and lowest levels, or by letting the lowest level to
persuade the upper one, the influence of this lowest stra-
tum of the population is highly boosted, generally at the
expenses of the intermediate one.
The model can be improved by considering the stub-
bornness (resistance to change its opinion) of the agents,
as well as the social mobility that will permit a success-
ful persuading agent to go to higher authority strata. We
are conducting studies in these directions, as well as con-
sidering a higher number of levels in the hierarchy.
IV. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
M. F. Laguna thanks the Solid State Group of Centro
Ato´mico Bariloche for the use of computational facilities
and the hospitality of the Instituto de F´ısica, Universi-
dade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, Brazil.
S. Risau-Gusman acknowledges support from the Centro
Latinoamericano de F´isica. G. Abramson acknowledges
support from Fundacio´n Antorchas (Argentina). J.R.
Iglesias acknowledges support from Conselho Nacional
6de Desenvolvimento Cient´ıfico e Tecnolo´gico (CNPq,
Brazil). The authors thank D.H. Zanette for valu-
able discussions and acknowledge partial support from
CAPES (Brazil) and SETCYP (Argentina) through the
Argentine-Brazilian Cooperation Agreement BR 18/00
as well as the hospitality of the Consortium of the Amer-
icas for Interdisciplinary Science, University of New Mex-
ico during the final stages of the work.
V. APPENDIX
We assume that there are enough agents in each sub-
group to have a uniform distribution of internal variables.
At each time step two agents are chosen at random, and
only the opinion of the second agent will be changed, ac-
cording to a rule depending on the authority labels and
on the internal variables. On average, this implies that
there is a probability βij that the second agent, of author-
ity j, will change its opinion to that of the first agent (of
authority i).
In order to obtain the dynamics of the subgroup Gij ,
we calculate the probability that members of the different
subgroups enter Gij and the probability that agents from
Gij leave it for different subgroups. Transitions are only
possible between subgroups with the same authority in-
dex, as this is a fixed variable. But these transitions can
be induced from agents from different authority groups.
Let us consider first the transitions induced by agents
belonging to the same authority group. The probability
of an interaction where one member of Gij convinces a
member of Gik (transition Gik → Gij) is gijgikβii, and
the result is the addition of one member to Gij . With
the same probability the opposite interaction takes place,
i. e. one member of Gik convinces a member of Gij ,
depleting Gij by one. Thus, both fluxes compensate,
and they do not influence the dynamics.
When considering transitions induced from different
authority groups, the asymmetry becomes manifest. The
probability that a member of Gkj induces the transition
Gil → Gij is gkjgilβki, whereas the opposite transition,
as induced by an agent from Gkl happens with probabil-
ity gijgklβki.
By taking into account all the interactions that add or
remove one agent to Gij , we get:
N gij(t+ 1) = N gij(t) +
+
∑
k 6=j
g1j gik β1i + · · ·+
∑
k 6=j
grj gik βri
−
∑
k 6=j
g1k gij β1i − · · · −
∑
k 6=j
grk gij β1i,
0 < i, j < r. (7)
The explicit temporal dependence of the g’s has been
left out in order to avoid an overcharged notation. Each
positive sum represents the total probability that a tran-
sition to Gij is induced by a member of each author-
ity group. Conversely, each negative sum represents the
probability that a transition from Gij is induced by a
member of each authority group. Grouping terms and
using the conditions
∑N
j=1 gij = ai we obtain:
N gij(t+ 1) = N gij(t) +
−gij(t)
∑
k 6=i
ak βki + ai
∑
k 6=j
gkj(t)βki,
0 < i, j < r. (8)
from where Eq. (1) follows.
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